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Abstract
We reviewed fundamental conceptual issues and the state of research on the definition
of and assessment of implicit theories. We grappled with the following controversies related
to the construct: (a) Are entity theory and incremental theory opposite ends of the same
continuum? (b) How can scholars use more sophisticated methodologies to classify
individuals into either the entity or incremental theory? (c) Given shifting conceptions of
what intelligence is, how can scholars refine the implicit theory of intelligence construct?
Given these conceptual issues, we then addressed practical issues related to the assessment of
implicit theories. We pointed to the need for more sophisticated methods such as implicit
associations tests, and the use of virtual environments as more “stealthy” ways to assess the
construct.
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The first challenge for this topical issue of the Zeitschrift für Psychologie arose as we
contemplated the appropriate term for our topic. Should the construct be called Implicit
theories, the way Dweck and Leggett (1988) first introduced the term in their seminal article?
Or should it be called mindsets, a term many have used? What about the more general term
self-theories, or lay theories, or naive theories? This challenge of coming up with an
appropriate term was exacerbated by the fact that the same authors would often use numerous
terms interchangeably. How, then, should researchers describe these fundamental
assumptions about human attributes, which individuals develop to explain and understand
their world? The seminal paper of Carol Dweck and Ellen Leggett (1988) introduced implicit
theories of intelligence and implicit theories of personality as conceptual terms, which are
both still widely used in research. In the last decade, however, more and more publications
started to use the term “mindset” instead of or interchangeably with implicit theories. But are
implicit theories and mindsets describing the same theoretical concept? How are lay theories
and naive theories related to implicit theories and mindsets? The precise nature and meaning
of the terms implicit theory or mindset have not been explicitly discussed in the relevant
literature so far. Precise definitions are largely missing and it seems that scholars assume that
their readers share the same understanding of what is meant by implicit theories, mindsets, or
other terms.
Despite the proliferation of terms used to describe these personal theories of seeing
and describing the world, one aspect of the concept has stayed constant. Regardless of the
name, implicit theories (or their related terms) have always taken on two different forms.
Dweck (1986) posited that people think of human attributes such as intelligence or social
characteristics either as (1) immutable traits (i.e., people are born with a particular
personality, which cannot be changed), or they view human attributes as malleable qualities
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(i.e., people are able to continually improve their base capacity to do mathematics). Dweck
and Leggett (1988) also argued that this belief about the malleability or fixedness of human
attributes does not have to be limited only to self-beliefs. Rather, they can also encompass
beliefs about other people, places, or phenomena. In addition, there has been debate about
how context-specific these beliefs are--can one possess a fixed theory of personality, but an
incremental theory of morality? A related challenge that we wrestled with as we
conceptualized this special issue is the fact that definitional murkiness leads to challenges in
measuring or assessing the construct. Are entity theory and incremental theory two unipolar
constructs or two ends of a bipolar construct? How can entity versus incremental theorists
clearly designated? The challenge of assessing this “messy” construct is made even more
difficult by the fact that implicit theories are difficult to directly observe simply because they
are just that--implicit! Therefore, definitional clarity is a sine qua non if we are to develop
high quality assessments for the construct.
Overview
One purpose of this paper is to tidy up the messy wording/definition and measurement
of implicit theories. Our hope is that by systematically reviewing the various ways scholars
have defined and assessed the construct colleagues in the field can take one step closer
toward definitional and conceptual clarity as well as create more valid and reliable ways to
assess the construct. To be clear, our goal is not to come to one single authoritative definition
of the construct, or to recommend the “best” way to assess it. Rather, our goal is to bring to
bare tensions in the literature in how the construct is defined, conceptualized and assessed,
and also identify areas of overlap.
“Same Same but Different”
“Same same but different” is a common phrase used by native Thai speakers when
referring to things that appear similar but are still meaningfully different. This famous
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Tinglish phrase can also be applied to the wording issues related to the construct of implicit
theories. In the academic literature one can find numerous terms describing the same thing-implicit theories (e.g. Dweck & Leggett, 1988), implicit beliefs (e.g. Haselhuhn, Schweitzer,
& Wood, 2010; Howell & Buro, 2009), worldviews (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a;
Malmberg & Little, 2007), mindsets (Dweck, 2006), self-theories (Dweck, 2000), meaning
systems (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), lay theories (Molden & Dweck, 2006) and
naive theories (Miele & Molden, 2010; Heider, 1958; Wegener & Petty, 1998). This
incongruence in terminology is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to the
pioneering work of Solomon Ash (1946), Lee Cronbach (1965; implicit theory of
personality), and Fritz Heider (1958; common-sense psychology). Heider (1958) studied
interpersonal relations using common-sense psychology, which he also called naive
psychology or implicit theory. In a similar manner, Dweck and her colleagues have
introduced and popularized different terms without explicitly defining or distinguishing
among the terms. The first term Dweck and her colleagues used was implicit theories (Dweck
& Leggett, 1988). From there, self-theories and mindsets began gaining traction, and are now
commonly used both in popular literature (e.g., Dweck, 2006) and in scholarly literature (e.g.,
Rattan, Savani, Chugh, & Dweck, 2015). The terms most often used in empirical studies to
describe the research in the tradition of Dweck seems to be implicit theories, lay theories,
self-theories, and mindsets. The use of different names can be partly explained by
psychological disciplines in which the research was done. Lay theories and naive theories are
more used in social psychology (e.g. Wesnousky, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2015) and
experimental psychology (e.g. Miele & Molden, 2010) whereas implicit theory and mindsets
commonly used in educational (e.g. Bråten & Strømsø, 2004) and developmental psychology
(e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). However, many empirical studies also
consequently use more than one of the aforementioned terms without recognizing the
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inconsistent labeling; this is also true for studies published more recently in high impact
journals such as Psychological Bulletin (implicit theory and mindset, Burnette, O’Boyle,
VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013) or Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (lay
theory & mindset in Yeager, Walton, et al., 2016). Are researchers really talking about the
same construct but using different labels (cf. Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, &
Harackiewicz, 2010 for an example in achievement goal theory)?
We start with the original label of implicit theories, which can be defined as, “core
assumptions about the malleability of personal attributes. They are called ‘implicit’ because
they are rarely made explicit, and they are called ‘theories‘ because like a scientific theory,
they create a framework for making for prediction and judging the meaning of events in one’s
world.” (Yeager & Dweck, 2012, p. 303). Lay theories or naive theories can generally be
described as common sense heuristics that people use to make sense of themselves and the
world (Heider, 1958; Wegener & Petty, 1988). The term “theories” is one common aspect
that the various terms share (naive theories, lay theories, self-theories), and describes a goal
of holding an abstract understanding of the workings of the social world. A second common
feature of these theories is that, unlike scientific theories, they tend to be intuitive and are
formulated by lay people rather than experts in a field. A third common aspect is that people
are not necessarily aware of their lay theories. They are rarely explicitly articulated in the
mind of the person holding them. However, the term implicit can also cause confusion. In
work on social cognition the term implicit is associated with the inability of people to report
the existence or operation of some entity or past experience. But research exploring implicit
theories of intelligence goes against this notion because people are often quite able to report
their beliefs. For this reason, we agree with other scholars (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1988) who
argue that lay or naive theories are in fact accessible to the person holding those beliefs.
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Given the description of lay or naive theories, could the term mindset also be
considered a type of lay or naive theory? The term mindset was introduced in the nonacademic book Mindset (Dweck, 2006) and has also been used in research publications ever
since. Presently, from the perspective of scientific research a precise and meaningful
definition of mindset is largely lacking. Turning to definitions from English dictionaries
(Macmillian Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Online Etymology Dictionary, Oxford
Learner's Dictionary) a mindset can be described as a particular way of thinking, a person’s
attitude or set of attitudes/opinions/ideas about something. A mindset may also be connected
with some sort of stability or fixedness but this was not a common aspect of the different
non-scientific definitions we observed. These definitions do not contain the three common
aspects (theory, intuitive, unaware) that lay, naive, and implicit theories share. For these
reasons, we believe that using the term mindset has a clear purpose for the scientific
community to easily bridge the gap between the theoretical world of academic scientists on
the one hand, and widespread practice among the general public on the other. We
acknowledge how important it is for academic knowledge to make a positive impact on
society. After all, as Schober, Brandt, Kollmayer, and Spiel (2016) noted, this is the third
mission of science. That is, universities and academics should use the results produced by
their first mission (teaching) and second mission (research) to address growing social,
economic, and societal challenges. However, for rigorous research, where clear specification
of terms is essential in correctly operationalizing the construct of interest, the use of the term
mindset seems to do more harm than good.
Instead of using the word mindset in academic research, we suggest using the terms
incremental and entity theory (Dweck, 1986), which clearly refer to the research on the
malleability of human attributes. On a higher level it seems justified based on enough
conceptual overlap to treat them as specific types of lay theories, naive theories, or implicit
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theories. However, from our perspective it seems desirable to avoid using different names for
the same construct. Instead, we should come to some consensus about a standard way to
name the construct. Our suggestion is just to use the term implicit theory because it captures
all aspects of the construct and is by far the most commonly used term, and the one with
which Dweck and her colleagues started.
Can People Hold More Than one Theory?
Another question we faced regarding implicit theories is the question of whether
people can simultaneously hold both an incremental and an entity theory in the same domain
(e.g., achievement; see Anderson, 1995; Schunk, 1995). Most conceptual papers and
empirical studies have treated the two implicit theories as mutually exclusive beliefs. For
example, Dweck et al. (1995b) argued that, “believing that something cannot be changed is
the logical opposite of believing it can be changed” (p. 323). In fact, in all of their empirical
work, Dweck and her colleagues have conceptualized incremental and entity beliefs as
opposite ends of a single continuum (e.g. Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995a).
However, there were some critical comments about the appropriateness of a unidimensional
conceptualization and the possibility of holding competing cognitions. Especially in
achievement situations individuals could simultaneously entertain incremental and entity
beliefs (Schunk, 1995). Anderson (1995) argued that it was possible that incremental and
entity theories were simply knowledge structures, which were freely available for individuals
to access. Whether people accessed one or the other depended on how the specific context
made one belief more salient than the other. This could be quite possible given the seeming
ease with which both theories can be experimentally manipulated (Dinger & Dickhäuser,
2013). Although Dweck and colleagues (1995b) also recognized the possibility that people
can hold both beliefs at the same time this did not lead to major changes in the
operationalization of implicit theories in their empirical studies. In the vast majority of
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empirical studies, instead of two unipolar constructs of implicit theories one bipolar construct
is used (see the latest meta-analysis of Burnette et al., 2013; Tempelaar, Rienties, Giesbers, &
Gijselaers, 2014). This is usually accomplished by reverse scoring the entity scale measure
and combining it with the incremental scale score to calculate a mean implicit theory score.
From a methodological point of view, such a consolidation would be only acceptable when
the two unidimensional implicit theory scales prove to be strongly inversely related.
Studies dealing with this issue are rare (e.g. Bråten, & Strømsø, 2004; Howell & Buro,
2009; Malmberg & Little, 2007; Tempelaar et al., 2014). Findings show that bivariate
correlations, when reported, vary widely (ranging from -.02 to -.78) but in general are too
weak. Some studies using exploratory factor analysis have revealed two distinct factors (e.g.
Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005). And confirmatory factor analyses have shown better model fit for
a two-factor model compared to a single bipolar factor model (see Tempelaar et al., 2014).
These findings suggest a much looser coupling of entity and incremental theories and raise
doubts about whether they should be treated as a single bipolar construct in empirical
research. Perhaps, as other scholars have done (e.g., Chen, 2012; Dai & Cromley, 2014;
Tempelaar et al., 2014), both the entity theory and incremental theory construct should be
modeled together--treating each as its own construct.
Another common practice to measure implicit theories is just to include entity theory
items (e.g. Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Lüftenegger et al., 2015; Pomerantz &
Kempner, 2013; Yeager, Romero, et al., 2016) whereby disagreement with these statements
reflects the endorsement of an incremental theory. This procedure is mainly chosen to avoid a
possible bias because the incremental theory statements tend to be more compelling and the
more socially desirable choice, and respondents tended to universally endorse them (Erdley,
Loomis, Cain, Dumas-Hines, & Dweck, 1997; Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013). Hence, the
inclusion of incremental theory statements has the potential to interfere with students’
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endorsement of entity theory statements. On the other hand, offering only entity theory items
runs the risk of an acquiescence response bias, which results in an overestimation of an entity
theory endorsement.
There are also measures that are constructed to follow a strict bipolar
conceptualization of implicit theories (e.g. Spinath & Schöne, 2003). They are, however, used
less often (e.g. Dickhäuser, Dinger, Janke, Spinath, & Steinmayr, 2016; Lüftenegger, Tran,
Bardach, Schober, & Spiel, in press). In this format, respondents complete statements by
indicating, using a 6-point semantic differential, the degree to which a certain quality is
malleable (sample item: “You have a certain amount of intelligence ‘that cannot be changed’
versus ‘that can be changed’ ’’). In this way, respondents can decide between entity and
incremental theory on a continuum within one statement. Respondents disagreeing with entity
statements are therefore given the opportunity to choose an incremental theory thus avoiding
a possible acquiescence bias.
From our perspective, there is enough evidence that challenges the traditional and still
dominant conceptualization that incremental and entity theories appear to be each other’s
opposite. In addition to theoretical considerations a number of empirical studies suggest that
people can hold more than one implicit theory. However, because there are relatively few
empirical studies, it is difficult to discern where the weight of the evidence falls. For this
reason, we recommend further empirical studies exploring, for example, whether modeling
incremental and entity theories separately as their own unidimensional constructs has better
predictive validity than modeling the incremental and entity theories as opposite ends of the
same construct.
Classification of Entity versus Incremental Theorists
How do researchers decide whether to classify a participant as an entity theorist or an
incremental theorist? Dweck and colleagues (1995a), for example, categorize respondents as
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entity theorists if their overall implicit theory score is 3.0 or below (on a 6-point scale), and
as incremental theorists if their overall score is 4.0 or above. The subjects in the middle, the
mixed or neutral group, are normally excluded from former analysis (according to Dweck et
al., 1995a, this group tend to be about 15% of a sample). An empirical strategy for the
classification of the three groups (entity, incremental, mixed) is using 1 Standard Deviation
above and below the theory of intelligence mean score (Blackwell et al., 2007). There are
several critical issues associated with these classification strategies. First, from a theoretical
perspective cutoffs suggest that a clear differentiation between different categories based on
specific criteria is possible. However, as far as we know clear criteria that differentiate the
different groups at a specific point are still missing as well as a clear definition of the mixed
group. Additionally, the merit of a priori categorization of individuals into specific groups
can be quite misleading (Peterson, 1995). Second, different frequencies of the three groups
exist across samples and domains, and the use of a fixed cutoff criterion limits
generalizability. Third, based on the criterion for exclusion the mixed group could be quite
large. Tempelaar et al. (2014), for example, found 64% of the whole sample (n = 4594)
belonging to the mixed group when using M ± 1SD as a classification criterion. The
remaining 18.2% of entity theorists and 17.8% of incremental theorists would represent
extreme groups and conclusions drawn by results of extreme group comparisons are strongly
limited (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005).
From a methodological perspective, dichotomizing the implicit theory construct has
substantial negative consequences. Depending on design and analysis this can include loss of
information about individual differences, loss or overestimation of effect size, loss of power,
spurious statistical significance, or loss of measurement reliability (MacCallum, Zhang,
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). These consequences can be easily avoided by application of
standard methods of regression or correlational analysis to the original (undichotomized)
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measures. Another possible alternative to dichotomizing the construct is simply to model
both constructs within a person-centered analytical approach (e.g., cluster analysis or latent
profile analysis). By doing this, scholars are able to create groups not by arbitrary cutoffs.
Rather, the groups are formed by what the actual data reveal. Finally, if we recognize the
possibility of endorsing both implicit theories simultaneously, then a strict dichotomization
along with the exclusion of a mixed group becomes less defensible. From our perspective,
there is no good reason for dichotomizing the implicit theory measure, nor is there a good
reason to exclude the mixed group.
Definition and Malleability of Intelligence
As noted earlier, there is little empirical evidence suggesting that individuals’ belief
about the malleability of intelligence is strongly inversely related to their belief in the
fixedness of intelligence. A possible explanation may be that people have varying personal
definitions of intelligence (Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005). Empirical evidence reveals that
neither laypersons nor experts see intelligence as a unidimensional construct. This more
nuanced (and Western cultural) conception of intelligence typically consists of three distinct
dimensions: practical-problem solving (fluid ability), verbal ability (crystallized ability), and
social competence (Sternberg, 1985). Sternberg also noted that experts include motivation as
a fourth dimension of intelligence. Individuals use these implicit dimensions to form abstract
characterizations and to evaluate their own intelligence, and that of others (Sternberg, 1985).
Simply asking about the malleability of intelligence, therefore, is likely incongruent with
most people’s multidimensional view of the construct. People might believe that verbal
ability, for example, is a fixed trait, but simultaneously believe that social competence is
malleable. This might especially be the case for adults because they are more likely to have
had many opportunities developing competencies in different contexts over multiple phases
of life (Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005).
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Alternative Approaches for Assessing Implicit Theories
Although incremental and entity theories are implicit in their nature they are
traditionally observed using explicit measures. Implicit theory assessments across domains
typically use a standard assessment adapted from the original measure of implicit theories of
intelligence (Dweck, 2000). This assessment is a brief self-report questionnaire asking
respondents to rate the degree to which they endorse entity or incremental statements from a
given domain. Alternative assessments are largely missing, especially those that tap into
implicit theories in an implicit fashion. Implicit measures such as priming or the implicit
association test (IAT) provide information about the construct of interest without directly
asking people for a verbal report (for an overview see Fazio & Olsen, 2003). The appeal is
that the outcomes of implicit measures can more easily reduce the effects of social
desirability. Furthermore, they avoid common shortcomings of self-reports such as the risk of
acquiescence responding or that people report more than they actually know (flawed
introspectionism; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). To the best of our knowledge only one study by
Mascret and colleagues (2015) examined implicit theories using an implicit measure. They
created a single-target IAT to measure if individuals adhered to an entity theory or
incremental theory. Their findings are only partly in accordance with findings from explicit
(self-report) measures.
Studies using measures other than self-report are scarce. Behavioral measures to
identify or investigate implicit theories are lacking. However, three neuroscience studies
(Mangels et al., 2006; Moser et al., 2011; Schroder et al., 2014) provide a new perspective on
the induction and consequences of implicit theories and give more insight in the neural
mechanism of implicit theories. Clearly, exploring how implicit measures, behavioral
measures, and a neuroscience perspective can complement and extend explicit self-reports is
an area that is ripe for future research.
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Virtual Reality
Another way to assess implicit theories could involve the use of computer
technologies. The capabilities of computer technologies have grown exponentially since the
first assessments of implicit theories were developed. This increased capacity allows
researchers to capture and analyze a large variety of data from research participants engaging
in authentic tasks. One of the downfalls of asking participants to respond to survey items is
that it is difficult to get situationally specific beliefs while people are engaging in a difficult
task. Survey responses that assess students’ implicit theories of intelligence capture what
students believe about intelligence in general. However, as we have argued earlier, implicit
theories might function as knowledge structures (see Anderson, 1995), which are freely
accessible and are activated by certain cues presented within the environment. For example,
students might be immersed in a virtual world in which they have to figure out how to source
of an ecological problem, which would involve designing scientific experiments to test
hypotheses, but could also require students to collaborate with other students effectively.
Some students, for example, might believe that their ability to figure out the causes of the
disaster are fixed, but that their ability to write a compelling argument to their colleagues
detailing how they arrived at such a conclusion is augmentable. This type of domain specific
assessment could be explored using virtual environments.
This idea is not a new one. Researchers in science education, for example, have been
developing assessments using immersive virtual environments (=IVEs) to assess students’
science inquiry skills (see Clark-Midura & Dede, 2010; Ketelhut et al., 2013; for a review see
Nelson & Ketelhut, 2007). For example, Ketelhut et al. (2013) started with the premise that
high quality assessments are inextricably linked to learning. In the context of science
learning, Ketelhut et al. argued that, “it is impossible to assess [the deeper understanding of
what scientists do] without embedding its assessment in content” (p. 176). The potential
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power of IVEs is that they are able to immerse participants in a dynamic learning
environment and create a physical and affective experience of “being there” (Dede, 2009)
while interacting with actual academic content. Some empirical research has revealed that
IVEs are effective when they build a cohesive and compelling narrative to engage students in
a particular learning space (Barab, Sadler, Heiselt, Hickey, & Zuiker, 2007; Girard et al.,
2013; Rowe, Shores, Mott, & Lester, 2010). This affordance of IVEs allows social scientists
to immerse participants in a learning context that feels quite real and natural, where they are
enacting practices that are authentic to the learning context. By situating assessments within
an appropriate learning context, assessment creators can increase the ecological validity of
their assessments.
Translating this approach from assessing scientific inquiry skills to assessing implicit
theories is possible, but will require significant work if these approaches are to be reliable and
valid. For example, researchers could design an environment in which students have to use an
assortment of strategies to solve a series of problems that get progressively more difficult.
Researchers could then observe whether students used those strategies in a systematic way, or
if they just provided an answer and either moved on when getting it right or quit when they
failed. According to Dweck and Leggett (1988), people holding a fixed theory might behave
just like those holding an incremental theory of ability until they run into significant
challenges. By observing what students do and say in the face of challenges, researchers can
make inferences about students’ theories of ability.
Of course, assessing implicit theories in this way requires researchers to be absolutely
clear about what it actually means to hold a fixed or incremental theory of ability, and what
specific things they do and say. For example, although Dweck and her colleagues have
pointed to goal orientations, effort beliefs, use of strategies, and persistence in the face of
failure as outcomes of implicit theories of ability, it is not yet clear how researchers would
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assess students’ beliefs about the fixedness of ability rather than, for example, beliefs about
effort. Other than giving up in the face of failure or refusing to use strategies, what specific
things do students do or say to show that they think that their abilities are static versus
malleable? In the earlier example of presenting students with progressively more difficult
inquiry challenges, does giving up on a challenge mean that students think that they are not
smart enough to figure it out, or does it instead mean that students felt that it was not worth
their efforts to go through the trouble of engaging in those strategies? Those are two different
constructs—the first is a fixed theory of ability, but the second is an example of students’ cost
value beliefs. Creative design decisions will have to be implemented that assess students’
implicit theories of ability without bluntly asking them whether they think that their ability is
static or augmentable. Thus, although assessments using virtual environments hold great
promise in their ability to assess beliefs at a finer grain size couched within specific learning
contexts, designing such assessments will take much work before they can be reliably and
validly used.
Summary and Conclusions
Despite the rich literature base and long history of research on implicit theories, there
still remain large gaps in the research base. By outlining the conceptual controversies in the
current literature, we highlighted the fact that much theoretical work still needs to be done in
examining whether the implicit theory construct is indeed multidimensional or
unidimensional. We also highlighted the need to examine how ongoing changes in how both
laypersons and experts view the concept of intelligence change the way in which we conceive
of the concept of implicit theories of intelligence. Our review also highlighted large gaps in
our understanding about practical issues such as how to assess implicit theories in much more
sophisticated ways than what scholars have traditionally been able to do. Our hope is that this
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special issue will encourage scholars from a wide range of disciplines to thoughtfully
examine how they can operationalize and assess implicit theories.
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